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This study examines the postacquisition accounting performance of acquiring 
firms in the restaurant industry between 1992 and 2012. Specifically, this study 
investigates the effects of different-sector and same-sector restaurants acquisitions 
between full-service and limited-service restaurants on restaurant firms’ performance. 
Additionally, the Wilcoxon signed-rank test and regression model are used to examine 
return on assets (ROA) and return on equity (ROE) for the accounting performance of the 
acquiring restaurants.  
The ROA and ROE reveal that the profitability is significantly negative up to 5 
years after firms are acquired. However, negative effects are strongest within the first 
year after acquisition and decrease until 4 years after compared with previous years. After 
4 years, the negative effects turn to positive compared to the previous year for ROA and 
ROE changes. 
Further, the study reveals that the difference between different-sector and same-sector 
acquisitions indicates no significant relationship between ROA and ROE changes during 
all 5-year periods. Overall, this study shows that the effects of acquisitions between
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different sectors and the same sector are negative and there is no significant difference 
between them.  
 




CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
During the early 1950s, the restaurant industry emerged as one of the fastest-
developing industries in the United States. Total sales growth increased from US$42.8 
billion to an estimated US$586.7 billion between 1970 and 2010, which represents an 
annual average sale growth rate of about 32% (National Restaurant Association, 2010). 
Total sales growth was predicted to be US$683.4 billion by 2014 (National Restaurant 
Association, 2013).  
Due to severe market saturation and low entry barriers, restaurant firms constantly 
need to pursue fast-growing strategies to survive and maintain competitiveness. 
Restaurant firms’ compulsion to grow quickly may be reflected in the merger and 
acquisition (M&A) phenomenon during the last decade. The restaurant industry 
experienced considerable M&A activity in the 1990s (Chatfield, Dalbor, & Ramdeen, 
2011), and the Chapman Group (2008) reported that 78 M&A transactions occurred 
among restaurant firms in 2003. That number increased to 112 in 2007. However, the 
M&A restaurant waves began earlier in 1985 (Harford, 2005).  
Conventional wisdom often considers M&As an effective growth strategy (Hsu & 
Jang, 2007) since efficient execution replaces the acquired firm’s inefficient resources 
with the acquiring firm’s superior resources (Trautwein, 1990). Montgomery and Singh
 




(1984) explained that M&As can increase market power and increased market power 
leads to more excess returns when a company has the ability to influence the price, 
quantity, and quality of products in the marketplace. Kiymaz (2004) also suggested that 
M&As contribute to growth, market expansion, and lower financing costs. However, 
acquisitions are not necessarily an effective tool for producing consistent growth in 
restaurant firms. Enormous barriers must be controlled to realize faster growth. 
Acquisitions involve a time-consuming process, and the real chemical integration 
required to achieve synergy is hard to accomplish (David & Singh, 1994). For example, 
the degree of the relatedness of the two firms, both operationally and culturally, varies 
among the acquiring and target firms, which affects the success of the M&A (Canina, 
Kim, & Ma, 2010). The target firm’s and the acquiring firm’s financial conditions, size, 
and location and the type of deal are also closely related to the success of the M&A (Kim 
& Olsen, 1999). Further, the duration of the M&A effect is still controversial, even after 
the transaction has been completed (Park & Jang, 2011; Yang, Qu, & Gu, 2009). Thus, 
most researchers have identified negative M&A effects for acquiring firms in the 
hospitality industry in contrast to conventional M&A benefits (Hsu & Jang, 2007; Canina 
et al., 2010; Chatfield & Delbor, 2011). 
However, since previous studies examined the effect of M&As from only the 
financial perspective, the results might be too limited to fully understand the various 
effects of M&As on firm performance in the restaurant industry. Additionally, in terms of 
the effect of M&As on firm performance, several studies have revealed that M&As had a 
positive influence on the acquiring and target firms in the lodging industry (Canina, 2001; 
Kim & Canina, 2013; Yang et al., 2009). Scholars did not fully explain U.S. restaurant 
 




firms’ use of M&As as a growth strategy since from 1992 to 2012 many restaurants 
extended their businesses through M&As. Therefore, more specific research models must 
be developed to understand restaurant firms’ post-M&A benefits along with the increased 
M&A transactions. 
In the restaurant industry, M&As occur between restaurants. In this industry, 
restaurants are divided into two categories: full service and limited service. There are 
distinctive differences in financial characteristics between full-service and limited-service 
restaurants in terms of their financial and operational resources (Gu, 1993; Petraf, 1993; 
Tse & Olsen, 1988; Walker & Johnson, 2002). The varying financial and operational 
resources influence restaurants’ accounting performance differently (McCool & Gu 1993; 
Youn & Gu, 2010). For example, the degree of standardization of the restaurant operation 
process, the level of employee skill, advertisement expense, and food costs are quite 
different between full-service and limited-service restaurants. Therefore, investigating the 
effects of acquisition is important to understand which types of acquisitions between full-
service and limited-service restaurants improve accounting performance.   
The primary purpose of this study is to examine the effects of acquisition on firms’ 
accounting performance among different restaurant sectors. The study categorizes 
acquisitions into two distinctive types, which are different-sector (full-service or limited-
service restaurants acquire limited-service or full-service restaurants) and same-sector 
acquisitions (full-service or limited-service restaurants acquire full-service or limited-
service restaurants), since each restaurant sector has different operating and financing 
characteristics. 
 




This study investigates the effects of acquisitions on the firm performance of the 
restaurant industry by comparing the two sectors. Consequently, this study tries to 
identify the different postacquiring accounting performance between different-sector and 
same-sector acquisitions and suggest which types of acquisition are better for the 
acquiring firms’ profitability (return on assets [ROA] and return on equity [ROE]).  
 
1.2 Study Objectives and Research Questions 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the effects of acquisitions on restaurant 
firms and to compare the performances of the restaurant sectors. Generally, restaurants 
are classified as full-service and limited-service restaurants. Acquisitions between full-
service restaurants and limited-service restaurants are classified as different-sector and 
same-sector sector acquisitions. When a full-service restaurant acquires a limited-service 
restaurant, the acquisition is identified as a different-sector acquisition because the 
acquisition occurs in a different sector. When a full-service restaurant acquires a full-
service restaurant, the acquisition is identified as a same-sector acquisition because the 
acquisition occurs in the same sector. In addition, the acquisition is related to resource-
based views of the firm because each sector has different resources. 
 An analytical framework that will improve industry participants’ understanding of 
acquisitions among different segments of restaurants and the influence of strategic 
decisions on the firm’s performance connection is proposed. The following research 
questions focused this study: (a) Does the postacquisition period of acquiring other 
restaurants significantly influence accounting performance? (b) Which type of 
 




acquisition, different sector or same sector, more significantly influences firm 
performance? The study questions are shown in Table 1.1. 
 
Table 1.1. Types of Restaurant Acquisitions 
  Acquisitions 




 Full-service restaurants 
acquire limited-service 
restaurants  
 Full-service restaurants 
acquire full-service restaurants 
Limited-
service 








Before firm accounting performance is examined through acquisitions, the 
restaurant industry must be evaluated in terms of the differences between restaurant 
sectors as a whole. Several studies have suggested that restaurants differ across sectors in 
terms of organizational environment and financial performance. In limited-service 
restaurants, standardization of food such as taste, packing, and operating system is higher 
than in full-service restaurants (National Restaurant Association, 2010). Walker and 
Johnson (2002) reported that full-service restaurants are more labor intensive than 
limited-service restaurants. The researchers also suggested that the labor costs of full-
service restaurants are higher than those of limited-service restaurants. Gu and McCool 
(1993) showed that inventory turnover and debt financing differ between full-service and 
limited-service restaurants. Full-service restaurants have lower advertisement expenses 
than limited-service restaurants. Additionally, the Franchise Finance Corporation of 
America (FFCA; 2001) showed that full-service restaurants spent about half the 
 




percentage of their sales on advertising compared with limited-service restaurants. 
Limited-service restaurants are more robust in economic or market downturns than full-
service restaurants (FFCA, 2001). Thus, the sectors’ resources differ.  
Acquisition is one diversification strategy and can be followed by theoretical 
resource-based views. In other words, the effects of acquisition on the restaurant sectors 
might differently influence a firm’s operating performance depending on whether the 
acquisition is made in different sectors or the same sector because different or similar 
resources are combined in an acquisition. Although many scholars have asserted that the 
advantages and disadvantages depend on the diversification strategy and the acquisition 
itself, recently, only a few studies on restaurant sectors have shown their different 
financing and operating characteristics. Several scholars have suggested that acquisitions 
affect firm performance in the restaurant industry. However, the effects of acquisitions 
between restaurant sectors are likely to differently influence firm performance based on a 
resource-based view.  
 The purposes of this study are to investigate the effects of acquisition on firm 
performance over the 1992 through 2012 period and to analyze the accounting 
performance of the two restaurant sectors. To further identify the effects of acquisitions 
on firm performance, the effects between restaurant sectors must be compared. Because 
an acquisition is directly related to the act of a combining different or same resources to 
form a single firm, an investigation of differences related to the type of acquisition could 
be important in terms of expanding practical knowledge and contributing to acquisitions 
between restaurant sectors. 
 




The study findings may help investors and managers better understand the return 
features of various types of restaurants and assess investment opportunities in different 
sectors of the restaurant industry. From these performance comparisons, restaurant 
executives many also find useful suggestions for implementing strategies that could help 
improve the firm performance of the acquisitions, and thus maximize shareholders’ 




CHAPTER 2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Overview of M&As 
Finance scholars have investigated various M&A waves with increasing scale, 
growth, and geographic diversification. Becketti (1986) reported that the Great Merger 
wave rapidly increased for monopolies in 1890s. The main purpose of the M&A wave 
was to stabilize prices by removing competitors rather than gaining economies of scale 
(Lamoreaux, 1988). The second wave occurred in the 1920s so oligopolies could hold the 
most market power in their own industries. Although the M&A trend emerged in 
horizontal consolidations in the same market (Becketti, 1986), the trend was economies 
of scale (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008).  
In the 1960s, the third wave was initiated by antitrust laws and firms’ movements 
toward diversification (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). The antitrust laws decreased M&A 
activity in the same industry and increased conglomerate M&A activity in different 
industries (Shleifer & Vishny, 1991). Firms in the 1960s generally used merger and 
acquisition strategies to enter new markets, which is unrelated diversification 
(Sudarsanam & Mahate, 2003). Unrelated diversification was expected to decrease the 
risks of volatile cash inflow as a means of developing firm value (Copeland, Weston, & 
Shastri, 2004; Montgomery, 1994). Acquirers created managerial synergy by obtaining 




However, the low performance of the conglomerates’ divisions resulted in 
ineffective management (Shelifer & Vishny, 1991), which triggered a fourth wave of 
M&As in the 1980s. Firms then focused on their main businesses, which is called related 
diversification (Andrade, Mitchell, & Stafford, 2001; Bhagat, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1990). 
In addition, deregulatory reforms allowed firms to make horizontal M&As (Martynova & 
Renneboog, 2008).  
Last, M&A activity was more sophisticated and more geographically dispersed 
between 1993 and 2001 (Martynova & Renneboog, 2008). M&As opened up the global 
market in terms of product, service, and capital, which drove cross-border M&As 
(Andrade et al., 2001).  
 
2.1.1 Motivations for M&A Activity 
M&A scholars have proposed numerous motivations for why firms perform 
M&As. Generally, scholars categorize firms’ motivations into four areas: market context, 
managerial power, environmental factors, and firm characteristics.  
First, finance scholars have investigated the impact of market power due to 
increasing firm-level pricing and power because firms gain a small part of their sales in 
the competitive market segment. M&As helped increase market power for firms. In 
addition, economists suggested that M&As were motivated by the desire to increase 
efficiency. Firms made related diversifications or unrelated diversifications to improve 
their efficient productivity. Agency researchers reported M&As help shareholders 




Second, finance and management researchers have also suggested that industries 
with higher chief executive officer (CEO) compensation generally show increased 
acquisition activity (Agrawal & Walkling, 1994). M&A deals are highly related to CEO 
compensation (Bliss & Rosen, 2001; Denis, Denis, & Sarin, 1997; Datta, Iskandar-Datta, 
& Raman, 2001; Rose & Shepard, 1994). Additionally, firms increase CEOs’ power and 
wealth, which can establish managers and decrease their employment risk (Gomez-Mjia 
& Wiseman, 1997; Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987). 
Managerial power was closely tied to shareholder returns to align managers’ and 
shareholders’ interest. 
Third, strategic management researchers have investigated whether the fit 
between environmental factors and a firm’s strategy stimulates acquisitions. 
Environmental uncertainty encourages firms to acquire other firms to decrease 
uncertainty. Highly diversified firms tended to create more M&As (Bergh & Lawless, 
1998). In addition, finance management scholars have suggested regulation influenced 
the likelihood of acquisitions (Beneish, Jansen, Lewis, & Stuart, 2008).  
Last, the management literature has supported the influence of firm characteristics 
on M&As. Baum, Li, and Usher (2000) reported that firms acquire other corporations that 
were geographically and organizationally similar. Further, firms that have more 
acquisition experience tend to have an increased likelihood of acquiring firms 
(Vanhaverbeke, Duysters, & Noorderhaven, 2002). In the finance area, many scholars 
have widely investigated the impact of M&As on performance relationships such as deal 
characteristics, managerial effects, financing and accounting performance, and 




2.1.2 Review of M&A Studies in the Hospitality Industry 
Although M&As has been examined with various strategies, few researchers have 
addressed M&A trends in the hospitality industry. Most scholars have shown that the 
returns to the merger participants fluctuated over time. Jensen and Ruback (1983) 
suggested that corporate takeovers generated positive gains and found that the target 
firms gained positive returns. Andrew (1988) empirically measured most of the impact of 
acquisitions on a hospitality firm’s value. He found that acquirers lost value during the 20 
days before the acquisition was announced. In contrast, target firms gained value during 
the same period; however, the size of the additional wealth gained was skewed upward. 
Kwansa (1994) estimated the size of the additional wealth gained by the equity holders of 
lodging firms acquired in the 1980s. He reported that the bulk of the additional wealth 
was created 2 days before and after an acquisition was announced. Enz, Canina, and 
Walsh (2001) investigated abnormal returns for lodging firms’ acquirers from 2 days 
before through the day after a merger was announced (–2, +1) between 1982 and 1999. 
The researchers found that lodging industry acquirers received positive abnormal returns 
on the day the merger was announced, but not before or after the announcement. Hsu and 
Jang (2007) asserted that most postmerger financial performances of acquiring firms in 
the lodging industry showed no significant relationship between the merger 
announcement and the change in short-term equity value, but M&As showed a 
significantly negative ROA and ROE after the merger for 5 years. Chatfield et al. (2011) 
suggested that acquiring firms have positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) except 
1 day before the announcement and the announcement day, but target firms have positive 




between the short term and the long term was not significant or negative from 1980 to 
2000. However, Yang et al. (2009) asserted that acquiring hospitality firms had 
significantly higher abnormal returns 12 months after mergers. Park and Jang (2011) 
investigated whether acquiring restaurant firms experienced higher growth in sales 
volumes than nonacquiring restaurant firms over a year; however, the effect of the M&A 
was not consistent after 1 year. 
In addition, the types of payment for M&As have rarely been studied in the 
hospitality industry because the payment method can significantly influence the returns 
for M&A participants. Acquirers have a choice among cash, stock, or a combination of 
both. Oak, Andrew, and Bryant (2008) suggested that debt ratio, capital expenditure ratio, 
and firm size are important for deciding the appropriate finance method for an M&A. 
They found that cash deals were preferred for M&As in the hospitality industry. 
Recently, Chatfield, Chatfield, and Dalbor (2012) found that cash financing was 
significantly positive for earning abnormal returns in the lodging, restaurant, and gaming 
industries. However, when acquiring firms used mixed cash and stocks, the effect of the 
abnormal returns was insignificant.  
 
2.2 Costs of Acquisitions 
Acquisitions separate management from ownership in modern multiowner 
corporations. Firms make acquisitions even when the managerial cost of the acquisition is 
higher than the marginal growth in the value of the firm (Barle & Means, 1932; Baumol, 
1959; Mueller, 1969; Williamson, 1975). Some researchers suggested that even though 




and successfully sharing strategic fit and organizational fit may depend on the 
characteristics of the process for making acquisition decisions. Acquisition decisions are 
distinguished from other strategic decisions because of the risk characteristics related to 
some degree of uncertainty (Haspeslagh & Jemison, 1991), and the uncertainty is 
associated with acquisition outcomes. The high rate of failed acquisitions demonstrates 
the significant potential for loss (Ravenscraft & Scherer, 1987). Additionally, 
acquisitions have high levels of risk for decision makers because of the visibility and 
tendency of acquisitions to induce intense personal commitment (Haunschild, Davis-
Blake, & Fichman, 1994). Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1990) suggested that the returns 
to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies, when it buys a quickly 
growing target, and when its managers performed poorly before the acquisition.  
Generally, scholars have become concerned with developing a better 
understanding of the cost of specific acquisitions. In studies, the cost of acquisitions is 
commonly explained in terms of three categories: deal characteristics, firm 
characteristics, and negative returns. King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin (2004) asserted that 
managers finance acquisitions with cash when the managers recognize their firms are 
undervalued and with stock when managers recognize their firms are overvalued. Several 
scholars have asserted that cash-financed deals are more beneficial to bidding firms’ 
shareholders (Carow, Heron, & Saxton, 2004; Huang & Walkling, 1987; Loughran & 
Vijh, 1997; Travlos, 1987). However, Heron and Lie (2002) suggested there were no 
significant differences in operating performance between cash and stock deals but 
showed lower postacquisition market returns for stock acquisitions than for cash 




abnormal announcement returns are higher for private firms than for public target firms. 
Although the types of deals in the restaurant industry have rarely been studied, some 
financial scholars suggested that managers of low book-to-market firms might make 
poorer acquisition decisions than managers of other firms. These suggestions imply that 
acquiring firms in the restaurant industry should consider that prior performance 
influences acquisition returns.  
Researchers investigating the cost of acquisitions have emphasized that the 
influence of different cultures and political characteristics (Pablo, 1994). An emergent 
and growing field of inquiry is the cultural dynamics of M&As and the implications of 
cultural differences for the postmerger integration process (Cartwright & Schoenberg, 
2006). Some scholars have sought to explain underperformance in terms of the effect that 
variables such as cultural distance (Morosini, Shane, & Singh, 1998), cultural fit (Weber, 
Shenkar, & Raveh, 1996), different management style (Datta, 1991; Larsson & 
Finkelstein, 1999), cultural change (Kavanagh & Ashkanasy, 2006), and cultural 
convergence (Birkinshaw, Bresman, & Hakanson, 2000) have on the integration process 
of firms engaging in M&A activity. These scholars suggested that strategic culture 
integration is very important between acquirers and targets to enhance synergy-
influenced long-term postacquisition accounting returns. 
Many scholars have also asserted that historical operating performance has a role in 
acquisition events. For instance, Heron and Lie (2002) suggested that postacquisition 
performance increased when bidders with higher market-to-book ratios acquired targets 
with low market-to-book ratios. Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1989) suggested that high 




benefited more from takeovers than high Tobin’s Q targets. The researchers also found 
that bidder announcement returns were negatively associated with cash flow for low 
Tobin’s Q bidders rather than related to cash flow for high Tobin’s Q bidders. 
Interestingly, this finding implies that acquisition performance increases when a high-
performing firm pairs with low-performing targets. Chatterjee (1992) suggested low-
performing targets provide upside restructuring value, which offers the greatest 
opportunity for value creation in takeovers. Researchers have also asserted that firm size 
influences the performance of acquisitions. Healy, Palepu, and Ruback (1992) found that 
large mergers resulted in positive postacquisition accounting performance and increased 
customer satisfaction, employee productivity, and asset growth (Cornett & Tehranian, 
1992). 
 In contrast, Moeller, Schlingemann, and Stulz (2004) found that small 
acquisitions by small bidders showed positive announcement gains, whereas large 
acquisitions by large bidders showed negative announcement losses. These studies 
indicated that large firms contributed larger acquisition premiums than smaller firms and 
suggested that large firms’ acquisition decisions played a more important role than small 
firms’ decisions. Thus, the role of firm size in the restaurant industry is an important cost 
factor in acquisition performance. 
Some scholars have observed that acquirers earned negative returns while other 
scholars have asserted bidders gained positive returns for M&As. Jensen and Ruback 
(1983) reported an average abnormal return of –5.5% during the 12 months after 
takeovers. Franks, Harris, and Mayer (1988) used a comprehensive sample of U.S. and 




reported negative abnormal returns. Franks, Harris, and Titman (1991) used an equally 
weighted index. The results generated with multiple factor benchmarks and the eight-
portfolio benchmark in particular showed no significant abnormal returns. These findings 
confirmed findings from earlier studies (Asquith, Bruner, & Mullins, 1987; Dodd, 1980; 
Langetieg, 1978; Morck et al., 1990). However, scholars have asserted that the acquiring 
firms’ shareholders gained normal returns over the 5-year period following takeovers. 
Additionally, Magenheim and Mueller (1988) and Agrawal, Jaffe, and Mandelker 
(1992) found that shareholders lost on average. The authors concluded managers sought 
to maximize firm size rather than shareholder wealth. Bradley et al. (1988) found that 
excess returns to acquirers after a takeover was announced decreased from about 4% in 
the 1960s to 1.3% in the 1970s and then to –3% in the 1980s. However, the scholars also 
suggested positive combined earnings for acquirers with public targets in takeovers for 
each period. Further, Jarrell and Poulsen (1987) and Bradley, Desai, and Kim (1988) 
suggested that multiple acquirers for a target were associated with significantly higher 
abnormal returns. 
Overall, although many scholars have explored whether acquisitions contributed to 
firms’ positive performance, product market, or capability domains, some scholars also 
found that due to the costs or risks of acquisitions that firms need to consider the 
framework of the firm’s strategic direction, the similarity of their organizational cultures, 





2.3 Gains from Acquisitions 
Acquisitions and mergers are still popular strategies. Since 1960, the Federal 
Trade Commission (FTC) has recorded more than 20,000 acquisitions and mergers. 
Acquisitions are generally good news for the stockholders of the acquiring firms. 
Benefits include economies of scale, attribution of monopoly or economic power, 
diversification, and increase in the stocks’ market ability (Butters, Lintner, & Cary, 1951; 
Edwards, 1955; Levy & Sarnat, 1970; Lewellen, 1971; Lintner, 1971).  
Global investment in mergers and acquisitions (hereafter referred to simply as 
acquisitions) has reached unprecedented levels in recent years (Barkema & Schijven, 
2008). Acquisition activity in terms of monetary and strategic issues has increasingly 
become a focus of study in several academic fields. Although this interest has generated 
considerable knowledge related to acquisitions, the range of findings from these 
comprehensive areas lacks theoretical integration, which constrains scholars’ ability to 
synthesize the remarkable contributions by each discipline. Acquisitions are a crucial 
activity for redirecting and renewing corporate strategy. Many researchers and 
practitioners have studied the executive as a rational decision maker, and investigated an 
efficient marketplace for a strategically advantageous acquisition. 
Given that, why do firms undertake acquisitions? Although many scholars have 
argued there are many reasons for acquisitions, three criteria, including market power, 
efficiency, and economies of scale, are examined here. First, market power is an attempt 
to appropriate more value from consumers. Although an early study did not find evidence 
of market power as an acquisition antecedent (Eckbo, 1983; Stillman, 1983), some 




firms. In general, mergers due to strategic management may improve the performance of 
the acquiring firm in an industrial organization. Mergers can be identified from the 
contingency framework for diversification strategies as described in strategic 
management studies (Christensen, Berg, & Salter, 1976; Rumelt, 1974) because mergers 
show diversification activity. An acquiring firm merges to achieve competitive strengths 
and improve the growth rate of the firm’s markets with the acquired firm. In addition, the 
more similar the environments of the two firms, the greater the performance profit for the 
acquired firm. The FTC classifies mergers as horizontal, vertical, product, or market 
concentric, or conglomerate, which indicates the amount of strategic fit achieved in a 
merger. 
Second, acquisitions are motivated by the desire to increase efficiency. Efficiency 
that reduces the cost of creating value results from improvements in long-term plant 
productivity (McGuckin & Nguyen, 1995) and public accounting service delivery 
(Banker, Chang, & Cunningham, 2003). Management scholars have shown managerial 
interest in an acquisition. Acquisitions increase managerial value since managers attempt 
to maximize their own interest.  
Third, Capron, Dussauge, and Mitchell (1998) suggested that managers view 
acquisitions as a means of promoting redeployment of assets and competence transfers to 
generate economies of scope. King, Slotegraaf, and Kesner (2008) showed that acquirer 
abnormal returns were associated with the degree of the acquirer and target firm resource 
complementarity. Redeploying resources enables acquirers to add to existing strengths 
and extend resources into new parts, and it contributes to economies of scale. 




resources. The market position and resources of firms involved in acquisitions affect 
future product market performance (Lubatkin, Schulze, Mainkar, & Cotterill, 2001). The 
empirical results show that synergy is the primary motive in takeovers with a positive 
relationship between the target and total gains. Thus, M&As do pay. 
 
2.4 Diversification 
Researchers have investigated the effect of unrelated diversification and related 
diversification. Firm diversification has been a widely accepted strategy in U.S. industry. 
In the current study, acquisitions are associated with unrelated and related diversification 
because restaurant firms diversify resources to enter sectors different from the firms’ own 
within the restaurant industry.  
Ansoff (1957) first used the term “diversification” to demonstrate corporate growth 
strategies involving entering new markets with a new product. Berry (1971) indicated 
diversification was an increase in the number of industries in which a business 
participates. Dundas and Richardson (1980) argued that when firms diversify, they 
differentiate markets and pursue more than one target market. This is one of the most 
frequently used definitions of diversification.  
According to Amit and Livnat (1988), diversifying business combinations helps 
increase the size of the business, accomplishes an economy of scale in manufacturing, 
marketing, and research and development (R&D), and thus produces synergic effects for 
an overall operation. Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) contended that through 
diversification companies seek to utilize excessive resources of current performances for 




be used to explain why a firm might choose to diversify: agency theory, the resource-
based view, and market power.  
 From the agency cost theory, managers may seek to diversify because it is 
expected to (1) expand their compensation (Jensen & Murphy, 1990), power, and prestige 
(Jensen, 1986); (2) make their positions with the firm more secure or less volatile by 
making investments that require their particular skills via manager-specific investments 
(Shleifer & Vishny, 1991); or (3) reduce the risk of their personal investment portfolio by 
reducing firm risk since the managers cannot reduce their own risk by diversifying their 
portfolios (Amihud & Lev, 1981).  
 In the resource-based view, rent-seeking firms diversify in response to excess 
capacity in resources such as productive factors. According to Penrose (1959), a 
diversified firm is an efficient form for organizing economic activities. For instance, the 
firm may use the same marketing and distribution channel to market a variety of goods or 
services. Montgomery and Wernerfelt (1988) noted that a firm’s resources differ in in 
terms of specificity. For example, more specific resources, such as productive skills in 
biotechnology, may be efficiently applied in only a small number of industries but may 
yield higher marginal returns because of their specificity unlike less specific factors such 
as standard-issue machines. In other words, for a firm with less specific resources, profits 
may be maximized at a relatively high level of diversification even though a firm with 
more specific resources could obtain higher profits with less diversification. 
 From the market power perspectives, this perspective argues that the large 




exploit, extend, or defend its power by tactics other than those that are traditionally 
associated with the view of monopoly. 
 Villalonga (2000) offered three anticompetitive motives for diversification. First, 
one industry uses the profits generated with predatory pricing policy in another industry. 
The second stimulus involves colluding with other firms that compete with the firm in the 
market. Finally, firms may use corporate diversification to participate in reciprocal 
buying with other large firms to drive out smaller competitions. Additionally, Rumelt 
(1974) claimed that diversification could be understood as an aggregation of two or more 
income streams. 
 However, Datta, Rajagopalan, and Rasheed (1991) argued that previous 
researchers overlooked industry structure (e.g., industry competition, concentration, 
growth rate, and profitability). This means that the performance of diversification 
strategies depends on the performance of the target industry.  
 
2.5 Unrelated Diversification 
Several scholars have suggested that unrelated diversified firms performed better 
than related firms (Luffuman & Reed, 1984; Michel & Shaked, 1984). Because the 
earnings streams from related diversification are significantly correlated based on 
business segment diversification (e.g., earlier-than-expected technological obsolescence 
of a similar production technology), it is unlikely that risk will be largely reduced. In 
addition, unrelated diversification could be more profitable than related diversification 
because unrelated diversified firms are in a better position to reduce the cost of capital 




 Going further, unrelated strategies might present some unique advantages of their 
own derived primarily from financial synergies. For example, portfolio theory suggests 
that industry-specific risk can be reduced only through extraindustry diversification 
(Kim, Hwang, & Burgers, 1989). Therefore, unrelated diversification can do more to 
reduce risk since this strategy involves business units in multiple industries (Amit & 
Livnat, 1988). Though some scholars (Lubatkin & Rogers, 1989) would take issue with 
this position by arguing that related firms enjoy reduced risk owing to their superior 
competitive advantage, on balance, most still believe risk reduction is a greater advantage 
for unrelated diversifiers (Barney, 1997). 
 Furthermore, the lower risk that results from portfolio effects and reduced 
probabilities of bankruptcy can also lead to increased debt capacity (Seth, 1990). These 
firms may also enjoy the windfall of reduced taxes, even in the absence of operational 
synergies because interest expenses are tax deductible. As a result, lower operating risk is 
associated with more stable cash flows and increased levels of leverage (Amit & Livnat, 
1988). 
 Recent conceptual developments in strategy have focused on diversification using 
a resource-based view of the firm (Barney, 1991; Foss, 1998; Wernerfelt, 1984). This 
method views the firms as a bundle of heterogeneous and imperfectly mobile resources 
(Wade & Gravill, 2003). Mobility is defined as resources that “can be bought and sold in 
factor markets” (Barney, 1991). Under this condition, the resources enable the firm to 
obtain sustained competitive advantage. The resource-based view of diversified 
corporations ultimately lies in sharing strategic assets and capabilities among entities 




 In terms of the resource-based view, resources are more easily shared in related 
diversification than in unrelated diversification (Capron & Hulland, 1999). Efficiently 
shared resources mean firms are expected to perform better than the sum of the separate 
resources in the business (Coase, 1937; Robins, 1992; Teece, 1984). 
 The type of diversification that might result from a resource depends on its 
specificity in a particular industry (Gorecki, 1975; Grabowski & McGuckin, 1985; 
Montgomery & Wernerfelt, 1988). If a resource can be used to produce only one product, 
then the resource is not suitable for diversification. However, most resources can be used 
for more than one end product (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). According to the 
substantial tradition in the literature (Macdonald, 1984; Montgomery & Hariharn, 1990; 
Teece, 1982), to make related or unrelated diversification work, three classes of resources 
are required: (a) physical resources, (b) intangible assets, and (c) financial resources. 
 A firm’s physical resources, such as a plant and equipment, are characterized as 
fixed capacity. They are generally useful in similar industries. If excess physical capacity 
motivates diversification, industries closely related to those in which the capacity is being 
used would be included (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). Barton (1998) and Bettis (1981) 
suggested that capital expenditures were associated with related diversification. 
 Intangible assets include brands and human skills. A brand name can be applied to 
several products with little or no adverse effects on existing applications. Similarly, a 
strong marketing team could successfully market in different markets without risk to the 
brand of the original business. A motivation for intangible assets is to present a 
developed approach that captures the skill base of relatedness (Farjoun, 1994), in 




(Barney, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Penrose, 1959; Teece, 1982; Wernerfelt, 
1984), and by practitioners who view these resources as essential to firm success (Hall, 
1992). 
 In general, financial resources are the most flexible of all resources because the 
resources can be used to buy all other types of productive resources. Financial resources 
can be classified as internal funds and external funds (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). 
Internal funds consists of liquidity at hand and unused debt capacity to borrow at normal 
rates. External funds consist of new equity and possibly high-risk debts. Several 
researchers found that lower levels of internal funds lead to lower levels of unrelated 
diversification and vice versa (Chatterjee & Wernerfelt, 1991). Since unrelated 
diversification tends to be considered risky by the capital market (Barton, 1988; Lubatkin 
& O’Neill, 1987; Montgomery & Singh, 1984), external funds would not generally be 
available for unrelated diversification. 
 The general belief is that physical resources and intangible resources are 
associated with related diversification, while financial resources are associated with 
unrelated diversification (Coase, 1937; Teece, 1982). Empirical evidence finds 
organizations diversify more broadly than predicted by Penrose (1959) and other modern 
resource-based approaches (Teece at al., 1997). Various researchers recognized an 
organization’s heterogeneous resources are key to explaining the behavior and 
performance of large diversified firms (Montgomery, 1994; Montgomery & Hariharan, 
1991; Teece, 1982), and thus, a conceptual model that integrates Penrose’s (1959) 
resource-based approach with an incomplete market approach (Denrell, Fang, & Winter, 




explaining unrelated diversification, this conceptual model also draws on dynamic 
capabilities (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000) and absorptive capacity (Cohen & Levinthal, 
1990).  
 Dynamic capabilities emphasize that changes to an organization’s resources can 
lead to increasingly unrelated diversification (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Helfat & 
Raubitschek, 2001; Miller, 2003). Moreover, since unrelated diversification broadens an 
organization’s knowledge base (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000; Hales, 1999; Miller, 2003), a 
diverse knowledge base can increase an organization’s “absorptive capacity” to 
assimilate a broader range of market opportunities (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Lane, 
Koka, & Pathak, 2006; Nicholls, Nixon, & Woo, 2003). As new information is 
assimilated, it promotes new learning, which can increase an organization’s absorptive 
capacity to further diversify into unrelated markets or industries (Bowman & Hurry, 
1993; Lane et al., 2006). Thus, physical resources and intangible resources (brands, 
human skills) can be beneficial for unrelated diversification. 
 
2.6 Related Diversification 
Researchers have investigated diversification and firm performance for almost 40 
years. Scholars have examined the relationship between diversification and firm 
performance depending on accounting-based performance and market-based 
performance. Ramanujam (1987) suggested that related firms outperform unrelated firms, 
using Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) count categorical classification. The 
entropy measure of diversification has been used by strategy researchers in response to 




Rumelts (1974, 1982) indicated that related diversification produces greater profits 
than unrelated diversification. In addition, related and unrelated diversification reduces 
profit volatility. Higgins and Schall (1975), Lewellen (1971), and Schere (1980) 
suggested that diversified firms can allocate their capital resources more efficiently than 
undiversified firms by optimally using internal capital. Martin and Sayrk (2003) 
illustrated that diversification can also mitigate failure in new markets through cross-
subsidization regarding the decrease in financial risk. 
 Some empirical studies have asserted that related diversification increases profits 
more than unrelated diversification (Barton, 1988; Bettis, 1981; Bettis & Hall, 1982; 
Lecraw, 1984; Lubatkin & Rogers, 1989; Montgomery & Singh, 1984; Palepu, 1985). 
Bettis (1981) found that related diversification outperforms unrelated diversification by 
approximately one to three points of return on assets. Palepu (1985) suggested that 
profitability growth is significantly larger with related diversification than unrelated 
diversification. Lubatkin and Rogers (1989) found that related diversification tends to 
create better market returns than unrelated market diversification. 
 Generally, related diversification happens when a parent and its subsidiary 
operate in congruent areas, while unrelated diversification occurs when a parent and its 
subsidiary operate in dissimilar areas. A restaurant that acquires another restaurant is an 
example of diversification because the investment is made in firms in various restaurant 
sectors. 
 Although advocators of related diversification contended related diversification is 
better than unrelated diversification in terms of profitability, defenders of unrelated 




opportunities (Scharfstein & Stein, 2000). Thus, unrelated diversification can increase 
profits more than related diversification because of the decreased cost of capital and 
investment in a better position (Hill & Snell, 1988). 
 In particular, some researchers found no evidence that related diversification 
provided more advantages than unrelated diversification (Bass, Cattin, & Wittink, 1978; 
Chatterjee, 1986; Grinyer & Yasai-Ardekani, 1980; Ravenscraft, 1983). Consequently, 
the profitable advantage of related diversification is conflicting in terms of its rationale 
and in empirical studies in terms of resource-based views. 
 
2.7 Tangible and Intangible Resources between Restaurant Segments  
An important notion that appears consistently in the resource-based view is 
heterogeneity in firm resources. These resources may be tangible or intangible and can be 
classified as physical and human. Homogeneous versus heterogeneous resource 
distribution has been discussed explicitly by previous researchers who compared the 
market model of competitive advantage (Porter, 1980) and the resource-based view of the 
firm (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). 
Tse and Olsen (1988) found that most executives in the limited-service restaurant 
segment perceived their strategies as primarily low-cost producers. In contrast, most 
executives in the full-service restaurant segment viewed their strategies as primary 
differentiation (Harrington, 2011). This suggested more reliance on heterogeneous 
resources for firms in the full-service restaurant segment. The National Restaurant 
Association suggested that the limited-service restaurants had relatively higher 




 First, marketing costs as a percentage of total sales are consistently higher for 
limited-services restaurants than for full-service restaurants. This indicates national 
branding (intangible resource) or marketing efforts that imply more of a focus on the 
industry as a level of analysis and external differentiation is characteristic of the market 
model of competition, which assumes homogeneous resources (Peteraf, 1993). 
 Second, limited-service restaurants appear to lend themselves more readily to 
standardization, which suggests more operating facilities (tangible resources). In addition, 
the higher employee turnover rate and nonhuman skills (intangible resources) in the 
limited-service restaurants suggest that any unique abilities will be more quickly 
dispersed to other firms in the segment (Decarolis & Deeds, 1999). Thus, full-service and 
limited-service restaurants are different sectors or segments in terms of the resource-
based view such as tangible and intangible resources. 
 
2.8 Financial Resources between Restaurant Segments  
The restaurant industry is particularly vulnerable during times of economic distress 
(Gu, 1993). In general, this industry has lower profit margins than other industries, 
averaging between 2% and 6% (Skidelsky, 2009), further aggravating the effect a 
recession has on the industry. Full-service and limited-service restaurants tend to react 
differently to the recession effect in terms of financial resources. 
 Full-service restaurants generally rely on high profit margins because sales are 
mainly derived from customers’ discretionary spending. When a recession occurs, 
customer sentiment and household income are lower, and full-service restaurants are the 




large sales volume to compensate for lower profit margins. Sales are primarily necessity 
expenditures. Limited-service restaurants have steadier revenues (Youn & Gu, 2010) 
while the liquidity and profitability ratios have generally improved in the postrecession 
period for full-service restaurants in restaurant sectors. That may mean that when 
restaurant firms operate in two sectors, the profits may increase more or better than when 
the parent restaurant firms operate in only the same sector. 
 Further, Gu (1996) suggested that full-service restaurants had a lower current acid 
test and operating cash flow to current liability ratios. In comparison, limited-service 
restaurants had a higher current and acid test ratio and cash flow coverage for current 
liabilities. Lower liquidity may partly be attributed to full-service restaurants’ increased 
interests because of increased long-term debt financing. Therefore, full-service and 
limited-service restaurants can be divided into different segments because the different 
segments have unique financial features in terms of financial resources. 
 
2.9 Types of Acquisition under Study 
In this study, the types of acquisitions include same-sector and different-sector 
acquisitions. When a full-service restaurant acquires a full-service restaurant or a limited-
service restaurant acquires a limited-service restaurant, the acquisition is a same-sector 
acquisition. When a full-service restaurant acquires a limited-service restaurant or 
limited-service restaurant acquires a full-service restaurant, the acquisition is a different-
sector acquisition. 
 Researchers have used three approaches to measure the difference between related 




and (c) resource-based views (Davis & Duhaime, 1992). Categorical measures are built 
on typological work (Wrigley, 1970) and typically involve classification of a firm in 
terms of one of several characteristic types of diversification. SICs are the most 
commonly used determinants in the literature. The resource-based view has been used in 
situations in which categories are hard to apply or where SIC data are not available, such 
as when diversification occurs within firm boundaries. Unlike traditional SIC measures, 
the new concept of relatedness views each industry or line of business as a combination 
of resources (Farjoun, 1998). 
In addition, many scholars have noted the shortcomings of using exclusively SIC-
based measures to determine the extent of diversification activities (Wade & Gravill, 
2003). In other words, the SIC code was considered along with a measure of 
diversification experience to determine whether a parent and a subsidiary were related. 
Consideration of only the parent’s SIC code might underestimate the extent of the parent 
firm’s experience in the industry. For example, a parent may operate in one industry, but 
investment may extensively occur in another sector of the industry. Thus, areas in which 
the parent firm has experience in another sector of one industry should be measured in 
terms of the resource-based view. Consequently, diversification within one industry must 
be determined by relatedness in the sectors or groups in terms of the resources-based 
view rather than by similarity in the physical attributes of products in the same industry 
(i.e., the four-digit SIC code). 
 For instance, the restaurant industry uses 5812 (eating places), and restaurants can 
be classified as full-service and limited-service restaurants in terms of the North 




statistical agencies to classify business establishments to collect, analyze, and publish 
statistical data related to the U.S. business economy. The NAICS was developed under 
the auspices of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and adapted in 1997 to 
replace the SIC system. In this study, the relevant sectors and the NAICS-based measures 
correspond empirically. 
 Full-service and limited-service restaurants make same-sector (i.e., full-service to 
full-service or limited-service to limited-service) and different-sector (i.e., full-service to 
limited-service or limited-service to full-service) acquisitions because of similar market 
profiles and resource endowments. Thus, the main purpose of the experiment in this 
study is to examine how the financial performance of the acquiring firm is affected and 
how the operating performance of the acquiring firm is influenced depending on a 
resource-based view when a segment is extended via acquisition. Consequently, in this 
study, the terms different-sector acquisitions and same-sector acquisitions are used. 
 
2.10 Hypotheses 
This study addresses a significant knowledge gap by focusing on marketing, 
financial strategy, and operating perspectives for sectors through the type of acquisition 
on the effects of particular theoretical importance and managerial interest. Thus, all else 
being equal, when a firm has a strong management strategy, the firm can generate profits 
and improve performance due to acquisitions. From this perspective, based on the 





2.10.1 Performance through Acquisition 
 Although a few studies investigated the effects of acquisition on restaurant 
performance, most examined only short-term and long-term abnormal returns by studying 
M&As. Previous M&A studies of the restaurant industry showed different results 
regarding whether acquiring firms had positive or negative or not significant abnormal 
returns in the stock market after acquisitions (Andrew, 1988; Enz, Canina & Walsh, 
2001; Hsu & Jang, 2007; Jensen & Ruback, 1983; Kwansa, 1994; Sheel & Nagpal, 
2000). However, stock returns may not correlated with a firm’s accounting performance 
because changes in the market valuation around the time of the takeover would not reflect 
the restaurant firms’ accounting performance.  
 In the hospitality literature, Hsu and Jang (2007) suggested that hotel firms’ 
mergers had a negative effect on ROA and ROE, but the study may not fully explain 
firms’ profitability. The authors compared the means of the ROA and the ROE of 1, 2, 
and 3 years before the merger and 1, 2, and 3 years after the merger, but the effect of the 
M&A could occur after the merger. Thus, a firm’s performance each year after the 
merger may need to be compared with 1 year before the merger. 
 Although no empirical study has investigated the long-term accounting 
performances of acquiring restaurant firms, theoretical arguments on the benefits of 
acquisition suggested firms can lead to increased acquisition performance through market 
power, efficiency, and economies of scale (Butters, Lintner, & Cary, 1951; Dussauge & 
Mitchell, 1988; Edwards, 1955; Levy & Sarnat, 1970; Lewellen, 1971; Lintner, 1971; 
McGuckin & Nguyen, 1995;). Similarly, through acquisitions, the restaurants’ 




 First, in terms of market power, restaurants can generate company-operated firms 
and more franchises or increase market share to control food price and production. 
Further, firms can increase sales growth and firm size through increased equipment and 
plants that contribute to productivity and reduce costs.  
 Second, in terms of efficiency, restaurant firms might have a low tolerance for 
risk and for the potential losses that could be incurred from investing in failed food 
products and quickly acquire food product skills. In addition, restaurants could make 
more effective strategic decisions to assemble a portfolio of complementary brands and 
products because different investment options can provide balance and diversify risk in a 
securities portfolio.    
 Third, in terms of economies of scale, restaurant firms can be managed such that 
there are low barriers to entry and there are a large number of entrepreneurs. 
Additionally, the firms can broaden their geographical range effectively by adding 
multiple stores and brands.   
However, some empirical studies found acquisitions had a negative effect on firm 
performance. For example, Singh (1971) suggested two thirds of the surviving companies 
reported lower profits in the year of the merger and three quarters had lower profitability 
in the third postmerger year. Dickerson et al. (1997) and Utton (1974) also asserted that 
postacquisition profitability deteriorated. Utton compared the profitability of a sample of 
merger-intensive firms with a random sample of firms that grew primarily through 
internal expansion and argued that average profitability measured by the pretax rate of 





In addition to firm performance, the link between acquisition and executive 
compensation was widely investigated in previous studies (Barle & Means, 1932; 
Baumol, 1959; Core, Holthausen, & Larcker, 1999; Elston & Goldberg, 2003; Finkelstein 
& Hambrick, 1989; Mangel & Singh, 1993; McKnight, 1996; Mueller, 1969; Williamson, 
1975). Executive compensation is one reason that firms make acquisitions. Large public 
firms need to hire high-quality executives, and they induce higher payments or bonuses 
for themselves (Agarwal, 1981; Core et al., 1999; Riahi-Belkaoui, 1992). In particular, 
Kroll, Simons, and Wright (1990) asserted that an increase in firm size achieved through 
M&As led to significant increases in CEO compensation for owner- and manager-
controlled firms. Thus, restaurant firms’ acquisitions could be also related to managerial 
compensation. 
In addition, scholars have often argued but researched less often that cultural 
differences can be a source of confusion, hostility, and distrust between the members of 
the merging organization (Buono & Bowditch, 1989; Krug & Nigh, 2001; Olie, 1990) 
and a major contributor to the high failure rates reported in the M&A literature (Datta, 
Pinches, & Narayanan, 1992; King, Dalton, Daily, & Covin, 2004). Restaurant firms that 
acquire other firms may find it hard to increase their performance due to cultural 
differences such as different cultural distance, management style, and cultural fit between 
acquirers and targets (Chartfield, Dalbor, & Ramdeen, 2011).  
In general, most restaurants are small businesses. Seventy percent have fewer than 
20 employees, and more than 70% of restaurants are single-unit (independent) operations 
(Chatfield et al., 2011). In recent years, the restaurant industry has experienced 




through M&As (Schwartz, 1999). Gu (2002) suggested that the restaurant industry had 
more business failures than any other industry that saw numerous M&As.   
 In terms of the theoretical advantages of M&A, the market power of restaurant 
firms may be limited because food is not a high-technology product whose prices can be 
controlled in the market. The price of food, depending on the menu, is generally 
consistent in the restaurant industry. Further, the efficiency of restaurant firms can be 
lower than other industries such as manufacturing and technology firms. Restaurants 
cannot effectively use or save food inventory for a long time because food is perishable. 
Of course, this study does not claim that market power, efficiency, economies of scale, 
compensation, and cultural differences are not necessary casual factors that contribute to 
the success and failure of restaurant acquisitions. Numerous variables have been 
proposed that influence the accounting performance of restaurant firms that engage in 
acquisition activity. Nevertheless, the theoretical benefits of M&As are weaker for 
restaurant firms compared to other industries because of the food and service industry. 
Consequently, the following was hypothesized: 
 
H1: Acquisitions have negative effects on restaurants’ performance over the long term. 
 
2.10.2 Different-Sector Acquisition vs. Same-Sector Acquisition 
Although a range of costs may increase during acquisitions, the data suggest that, 
in general, acquisitions are meant to maximize a firm’s value (Salter & Weinhold, 1979). 
The dominant theory related to how this value can be created suggests that firms acquire 




Synergy may imply that gains accrue to the acquiring firm through three sources: (a) 
improved operating efficiency, and plant, property, and equipment (PPE) based on 
physical resources; (b) some type of assets of brand and human skill transfer based on 
intangible assets; and (c) revenue, liquidity, and leverage based on financial resources. 
Some scholars have suggested that synergistic efficiencies generate market power over 
competitors (Bradley, Desai, & Kim, 1983; Eckbo, 1983; Montgomery, 1985; Stewart, 
Harris, & Carleton, 1984). 
 Traditional diversification scholars have argued that similarities among acquiring 
and target firms’ resources should lead to higher performance. Although a few hospitality 
scholars have suggested acquisitions had negative effects on firm performance, resource-
based view theory led to the conclusion that complementarity could be more important 
(Harrison, Hitt, Hoskisson, & Ireland, 2001). For example, full-service and limited-
service restaurants have advantages and disadvantages with different resource features in 
terms of the resource-based view. Each restaurant sector’s unique resources can be 
realized by integrating complementary resources through acquisitions. Complementing 
resources by different-sector acquisitions could provide more opportunity for the 
restaurants to create competitive advantages that could be sustained for a longer period of 
time than same-sector acquisitions because different-sector acquisitions could strengthen 
their advantageous resources and make up for their weak resources by complementing 
resources through acquisitions. Thus, the effects of acquisition on restaurant firms’ 
performance could be different depending on how each sector’s resources is combined. 
 Of course, same-sector acquisitions with highly similar resources may be able to 




sector acquisitions may not be able to develop other valuable potential synergies as a 
result of their integration because of the limitation of using various resources. In contrast, 
integrating different yet complementary resources between different-sector acquisitions 
may present more opportunities for synergy derived from tangible, intangible, and 
financial resources. 
 Barney’s (1988) proposition that synergy may be a necessary but not in sufficient 
condition to gain value for the acquiring firm may offer insight if a related acquisition or 
an unrelated acquisition produces more value. Barney (1988) suggested that value is 
created for the acquiring firm when private and uniquely valuable cash flows exist 
between the acquiring and target firms. Unique resources exist when an acquiring 
restaurant firm will benefit more than another acquiring firm from the synergy created 
through acquisition. Harrison et al. (2001) investigated combining resources through 
acquisitions, using a sample of approximately 400 acquisitions, to assess resource 
similarity versus complementarity. The authors suggested that resource complementarity 
creates the potential for greater synergy from acquisitions, leading to higher long-term 
firm performance as an end result. 
 In addition, a resource-based perspective of firm strategy (Wernerfelt, 1984) 
suggested that merged firms with high similarity and relatively different resource 
integration in critical areas could be expected to enjoy great performance improvements 
compared to merged firms with widely disparate resource distributions. Acquisitions of 
target firms with operating and corporate strategic resources for the acquiring firm are 
expected to produce significant synergies because the financial performance improves. 




may imply an appropriate combination of tangible, intangible, and financial resources 
with different resources between acquiring and target restaurants as the source of 
knowledge for value creation. Different resources could be more positively associated 
with resource complementarity in the different-sector acquisitions. 
 Thus, resource complementarity provides a rich base for the study of synergy 
between acquiring and target restaurants and the associated performance outcomes that 
result from acquisitions. The approach for the resource-based view of the firm could be 
more complementary than the traditional division between related and unrelated 
diversification because this study focuses on specific resource perspectives. 
 In the global economy, the most successful combined firms rely on 
complementary resources with different resources as the foundation needed to exploit 
entrepreneurial opportunities (Ireland, Hitt, Camp, & Sexton, 2001). This can be applied 
to restaurant firms because different resources combined can suggest stronger synergies 
for the development, cost savings, use of equipment, and financial structure. 
 Additionally, different resources for full-service restaurants and limited-service 
restaurants in terms of capital investments likely result in relatively high degrees of 
variance in the types of capital equipment used and the types of skills that employees 
possess. Full-service restaurants may acquire limited-service restaurants to extend 
economic scope, save labor costs, and use more debt financing. Such synergy may help 
the acquiring firm respond more quickly to competitors’ economic scale. Integrating two 
sets of different but complementary resources and capabilities allows firms to develop 
and take advantage of new opportunities (Hitt, Bierman, Shimizu, & Kochhar, 2001). 




participate in all types of restaurant sectors because the restaurants could be more 
effectively managed for financial fluctuations and operating systems. 
 However, same-sector acquisitions can be risky or less profitable than different-
sector acquisitions because the restaurants cannot be more effectively managed with 
similar resources for financial fluctuation, recession, and food flexibility. Same-sector 
acquisitions do not necessarily imply a lack of synergy, especially if the synergy is 
considered private. Barney (1988) asserted that above-normal returns can be generated 
for the acquiring firm in combination with the target firm if the synergistic relationship is 
unique for other acquiring firms. An acquiring firm with private synergy based on similar 
resource patterns is likely to have an advantage because other potential acquirers may not 
recognize or have the private synergy involved and, therefore, will not enter the auction. 
If differences are involved and the synergy is private, the degree of similar resources may 
not be immaterial between the sectors in the restaurant industry: However, private 
synergy is unusual in the restaurant industry because food and service firms rather than 
manufacturing or IT firms are involved. Thus, synergy from these similarities may be 
difficult for other acquirers to optimize and use; thus, they may offer fewer competitive 
advantages and more limited access in same-sector acquisitions in the restaurant industry.  
 In contrast, Hitt and Ireland (1986, 1985) found that firms may develop multiple 
distinctive competencies. Because of the combined competencies, merging two firms 
may create value that overcomes and controls weakness in one or both acquisition 
partners. In terms of the resource-based view, restaurants may acquire targets to be more 
attractive in different markets as well as efficient in the products and distribution of the 




effectively integrate and manage resources in order to use the combined benefits while 
same-sector acquisitions cannot adequately cope in the market. Thus, the relationship 
between different-sector and same-sector acquisitions was hypothesized. 
 







CHAPTER 3. METHODOLOGY 
3.1 Long-Term Accounting Performance 
Most researchers investigating mergers and acquisitions have taken a short-term 
view of the topic. Various measures have been used to evaluate the success of 
acquisitions. These include subjective evaluation (Kitching, 1967; Power, 1982), capital 
asset pricing measures (Elgers & Clark, 1980), and profitability measures (Dickerson, 
Gibson, & Tsakalotes, 1997; Kusewitt, 1985; Poindexter, 1970).  
 
3.1.1 Accounting Performance Measure: ROA and ROE 
Measures for average quarterly ROA and average quarterly ROE were calculated. 
These measures allowed us to compare differences in the productivity of the assets and 
owners’ equity. Although accounting measures have their shortcomings, ROA is one of 
the more robust accounting-based measures of economic performance (Brealey & Myers, 
1984). ROE provides an accounting-based measure of performance that includes the 
effects of financial leverage. Some studies have shown that the best strategy for 
maximizing profitability is not necessarily the best for maximizing growth (Reid, 1968; 
Rumelt, 1974). 
 First, ROA was computed by dividing net income by average total assets for each 
firm. The average ROA with the quarterly data for a specific year period (e.g., 1 year 




calculate the average ROA growth rate change for a specific period. Each average ROA 
growth rate change for a specific period was calculated by comparing the prior 1 year for 
each year (e.g., prior 1 year vs. post 1 year, prior 1 year vs. post 2 year, prior 1 year vs. 
post 3 year, prior 1 year vs. post 4 year, prior 1 year vs. post 5 year). An accounting-
based measure cannot be used to isolate the effects of an acquisition event. Biggadike 
(1979) and Lubatkin (1983) asserted that an acquisition did not affect profitability for at 
least several years. Thus, the effect for a specific period such as 5 years was studied. 
 Second, ROE was calculated by dividing net income by average stockholder 
equity for each firm. Each average ROE growth rate change was calculated with the same 
method for the average ROA growth rate change calculated. The change in the average 
growth rates for a specific period was calculated as the same method for the average 
ROA growth rate change and the average ROE growth rate change. 
 
3.1.2 Control Variables for Long-Term Accounting Performance 
Revenue is used as a control variable instead of a measurement of size in this 
study. Many general financial economics studies use total assets to proxy a firm’s size 
(Lang, Stulz, & Walkling, 1991). However, since franchising through acquisitions, a 
widely adopted growth strategy in the restaurant industry (Lee, Singal, & Kang, 2013), is 
prevalent, total revenues that include franchise fees more appropriately reflect a 
restaurant firm’s size than total assets. Therefore, revenue was included as a control 
variable. 
 Leverage shows the debt-to-assets ratio (total debt divided by total assets) and 




a firm to take advantage of tax shields due to the deduction of interest expense, which is 
helpful for increased cash flow and a higher Tobin’s Q (McConnell & Servaes, 1990). 
However, when a firm has excessive debt, the firm’s equity return may decrease due to 
the perception of risk in the market (Brealey & Myers, 2003). Thus, leverage was 
included as a control variable. 
 Jensen and Ruback (1983) suggested that liquidity is related to risk because high 
liquidity could result in agency costs with high free cash flows. High liquidity may not be 
efficiently invested for available resources, which may accumulate more risk (Borde, 
1998). Additionally, Chatterjee and Wernerfelt (1991) asserted that managers may have 
an incentive to increase the level of diversification to decrease risk with high free cash 
flows. In this study, liquidity was measured with the log of quick ratio (sum of cash, 
marketable securities, and accounts receivable to current liabilities). 
 Property, plant, and equipment (PP&E) was measured as a control variable to 
study investment opportunities in firms (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001) because PP&E 
means that a firm is usually characterized by profitable investment opportunities and 
invests in them. Thus, PP&E was likely to be related to firm performance in explaining 
firms’ profitability. This variable was calculated as the log ratio of property, plants, and 
equipment to total assets. For the control variables, the year the acquisition occurred was 
used. 
 
3.2 The Wilcoxon Rank Transformation 
Many nonparametric methods as parametric methods applied to transformed data. 




makes the results understandable and reasonable. This approach is a class of 
nonparametric methods. The rank transformation approach also provides a useful method 
in multiple regression, discriminant analysis, cluster analysis, analysis of experimental 
designs, and multiple comparisons. 
 The rank transformation approach provides a useful pedagogical technique for 
introducing nonparametric methods as an integral. Therefore, the Wilcoxon rank-sum test 
and the Wilcoxon signed-rank test were used to identify statistically significant 
differences between the full-service and limited-service restaurant sectors with z tests. 
 
3.3 Models 
To measure accounting performance, the regression model included the sum of 
two variables: average ROA growth rate change and average ROE growth rate change. In 
this study, the goal was to compare the two sectors. The variance of firms within 
different-sector and same-sector acquisitions is controlled by introducing control 
variables. As independent variables, control variables were used to use the entire sample 
because the constant term indicates the effect of the acquisition by using a regression 
model. In the study, dummy variables were also used for the type of restaurant 
acquisition in terms of different-sector and same-sector acquisitions (e.g., different-sector 
acquisitions: limited-service restaurants–full-service restaurants, or full-service 
restaurants–limited-service restaurants, same-sector acquisitions: limited-service 
restaurants–limited-service restaurants and full-service restaurants–full-service 
restaurants). As control variables, firm revenue, firm leverage, firm liquidity, and firm 




 For testing Hypothesis 1, ROA and ROE were calculated using net income as a 
percentage of the average total assets and net income as a percentage of the average 
common stock equity, respectively. The postacquisition performance of acquiring firms 
was compared with their performance 1 year before the acquisition. The average 
performance for a certain period (e.g., 1 year, 2 years, 3 years, 4 years, and 5 years 
postacquisition) after the acquisition was compared with the corresponding average 
performance in the all firms as well as between two sectors using paired z tests. The 
Wilcoxon rank test is more conservative than a t test, and it is less likely to result in 
statistically significant differences between preacquisition performance and 
postacquisition performance changes. 
 In addition, for testing Hypothesis 2, one equation measured the effect of the 
acquisition using the entire sample (t = year) among the average ROA growth rate 
change, the average ROE growth rate change, and the control variables based on 
acquisitions in the two sectors. The constant term indicated the effect of the acquisition in 
each sector. The accounting performance changes were measured with a metric with 
dependent variables in the linear regression. 
 Additionally, for testing Hypothesis 2, equations 3.1 and 3.2 tested the effect of 
acquisitions for different-sector and same-sector acquisitions to study which acquisition 
was more statistically significant. A dummy represented different-sector (as a reference) 
acquisitions that took 1 if there were same-sector acquisitions and took 0. A positive and 
significant coefficient of the dummy variable indicates that the different-sector 





∆ROAs t = α + 𝛽1 dummy + 𝛽2Revenue t + 𝛽3 Leverage t + 𝛽4 Liquidity t + 𝛽5PPE t + 𝜀 t 
                                                                                                                                       (3.1) 
 
∆ROEs t = α + 𝛽1 dummy + 𝛽2Revenue t + 𝛽3 Leverage t + 𝛽4 Liquidity t + 𝛽5PPE t + 𝜀 t 
                                                                                                                                       (3.2) 
 
Last, the effects of the acquisition on different-sector and same-sector acquisitions were 
measured to study which acquisition was more statistically significant.  
 
3.4 Data Collection Procedures 
The sample for this study consisted of publicly traded U.S. restaurant firms. The 
data used in this study were collected from COMPUSTAT and SDC Platinum using SIC 
5812 (eating places) and then divided by the NAICS codes for limited-service restaurants 
(722211 for the years before 2011 and 722513 for the years after 2011) and full-service 
restaurants (722110, 722511). There were 54 public full-service restaurants and 14 public 
limited-service restaurants in the United States. The data matched the COMPUSTAT 
data. 
 On SDC Platinum, 96 firms that had acquired other firms were found. Acquiring 
firms that were private firms, were not listed in the Center for Research in Security Prices  
(CRSP) database, or did not present information for stock prices per acquiring firm or 
duplicate firms based on ticker or not parent firms for acquirers were excluded from this 
sample. Finally, the sample consisted of 30 acquiring firms. The sample covered fiscal 




performances for the effects of acquisition. The average ROA growth rate change and the 
average ROE growth rate change were investigated to measure the effect of acquisitions 




CHAPTER 4. RESULTS 
4.1 Sample Profile 
Based on the firms’ major service features, the sample was divided into two 
sectors, full-service restaurants (20 firms) and limited-service restaurants (10 firms). In 
Table 4-1, details of the acquisitions are listed. 
 In Table 4-2, the descriptive statistics of accounting performance (ROA and ROE) 
and the control variables (revenue, leverage, liquidity, and PP&E) of all companies and 
then of full-service and limited-service restaurants in two sectors from an index for the 
20-year period from 1992 through 2012 are summarized. Table 4-2 shows that ROA is 
significantly positive for all acquiring restaurant firms in the means of the first, second, 
and fifth years after acquisitions. However, there is no difference between the full-service 
and limited-service restaurants. In ROE, the mean of the second year after the 
acquisitions is significantly positive for all acquiring restaurant firms. In addition, the 
value of the first year is higher in limited-service restaurants than in full-service 
restaurants. 
 Revenue, leverage, liquidity, and PPE are the status in the event quarter of 
acquisitions. Revenue and liquidity are higher in limited-service restaurants than in full-
service restaurants. However, PPE is higher in full-service restaurants than in limited-




 Table 4-3 gives the results of the Wilcoxon sum tests for after the acquisitions on 
firm performance. For ROA, the mean of the fifth year after the acquisitions is 
significantly lower in different-sector acquisitions than in same-sector acquisitions. For 
ROE, the means of the fourth and fifth years after the acquisitions is significantly lower 
in different-sector acquisitions. The result for the accounting performances was almost 
the same for all years. In addition, PPE was higher in the same-sector acquisitions than in 





Table 4.1. A List of Sample Restaurant Firms Created with Acquisitions 
Full-service  




























Benihana, Inc. Rudy’s Restaurant Group 
Ra Sushi Bar restaurant 
Teppanyaki Restaurant 





Biglari Holdings, Inc. Cracker Barrel Old 
Country 
02/17/2012 
Bob Evans Farms, Inc. Mimis Cafe 06/14/2004 Burger King Holdings, 
Inc. 











Maggiano’s Little Italy and 
Corner Bakery 
 
NE Restaurant Co Inc. 
 













Chuck E Cheese 
Restaurant  







Buca, Inc. Vinny Testas Restaurants 12/17/2001 CKE Restaurants, Inc. Summit Family 
Restaurant 
12/01/1995 
Buffalo Wild Wings, Inc. Avado Brands (Don 
Pablos) 




Jack In The Box, Inc. Qdoba Restaurant 
Corp 
01/21/2003 
Cracker Barrel Old City, 
Inc. 

















Table 4-1 (Cont.) 
Full-service  












Darden Restaurants, Inc. Quality Dining Inc. 
(Grady’s) 
Chevy’s Rio Bravo 
Restaurants 














Famous Daves of 
American, Inc. 
North Country BBQ 
Restaurant 
12/18/2009 Panera Bread, Inc. Bakery Cafes 06/21/2007 
Flanigans Enterprises, Inc. Dannys Restaurant 08/08/1997 Papa Bello 
Enterprises Inc 
Mama’s Direct Inc 01/04/2012 
Frisch’s Restaurants, Inc. Big Boy Restaurant 09/27/2006    




11/04/2011    
Landrys Restaurants, Inc. CA Muer Corp.  
Chart House Restaurants 
Saltgrass Steak House 
Schussler Creative (T-
Rex) 







   






   






   











Table 4-1 (Cont.)  
Full-service  












      
O Charleys, Inc. Burbet Foods  
Shoex Inc. 
J Alexander’s Corp.   
Stoney River Legendary 









   
PF Changs Bistro, Inc. True Food Kitchen 02/16/2012    
Red Robin Gourmet, Inc. Great Western Dining 
Top Robin Ventures 




   
Ruby Tuesday, Inc. Lime Fresh Mexican Grill 04/09/2012    
 










K-Bob’s USA Restaurant 
Pecos Diamond Steakhouse 
Western Sizzlin Franchised 
Restaurant 
Whistle Junction Buffet 
Restaurant 
Holiday House Restaurant 
Bar H Steakhouse 
Rankin Bros Inc. 
 
4Bs Restaurant 























Table 4.2. Descriptive Statistics of Firm Performance for the Entire Sample in the Two 
Sectors (over 1992–2012)   







  Mean Std Dev t value  Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev t value 
1st yr ROAc 0.051 0.064 6.272*** 0.044 0.051 0.070 0.091 -1.385 
2nd yr ROA 0.052 0.058 6.891*** 0.046 0.054 0.071 0.066 -1.376 
3rd yr ROA 0.019 0.127 1.143 0.005 0.138 0.064 0.072 -1.540 
4th yr ROA 0.006 0.154 0.271 0.000 0.149 0.022 0.171 -0.469 
5th yr ROA 0.033 0.106 2.077** 0.024 0.109 0.057 0.094 -0.900 
1st yr ROEd 0.241 1.644 1.154 0.018 0.462 0.881 3.124 -1.843* 
2nd yr ROE 0.090 0.132 5.169*** 0.086 0.104 0.101 0.199 -0.369 
3rd yr ROE -0.031 0.493 -0.477 -0.074 0.552 0.099 0.186 -1.145 
4th yr ROE 0.373 3.058 0.871 0.548 3.578 -0.090 0.457 0.662 
5th yr ROE 0.053 0.963 0.369 -0.075 0.889 0.404 1.109 -1.492 
Revenue 379.894 683.541 4.341*** 239.444 353.102 810.609 1156.747 -2.991*** 
Leverage 0.224 0.151 11.574*** 0.217 0.143 0.244 0.176 -0.588 
Liquidity 0.428 0.538 6.218*** 0.298 0.391 0.830 0.720 -3.654*** 
PPE 0.727 0.171 33.100*** 0.776 0.109 0.577 0.235 4.490*** 
Note: ROA= rate of return on assets; ROE = rate of return on common stock equity. 1st yr ROAc = first year 
ROA after an acquisition; 1st yr ROEd = first year ROE after an acquisition.  















Table 4.3 The Wilcoxon Rank-Sum Tests for Postacquisition on Firm Performance 
  Different-Sector Acquisitions (a) Same-Sector Acquisitions (b) H0: a=b 
  Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev  Z  
1st yr ROAc 0.034 0.090 0.057 0.051 -0.780 
2nd yr ROA 0.044 0.074 0.055 0.052 -1.389 
3rd yr ROA 0.034 0.082 0.015 0.138 0.190 
4th yr ROA 0.007 0.131 0.006 0.162 -0.655 
5th yr ROA -0.011 0.105 0.047 0.103 -1.757* 
1st yr ROEd 0.879 3.117 0.019 0.479 0.088 
2nd yr ROE 0.108 0.116 0.084 0.136 -0.354 
3rd yr ROE 0.094 0.131 -0.068 0.552 0.761 
4th yr ROE -0.020 0.207 0.494 3.497 -1.654* 
5th yr ROE -0.021 0.229 0.077 1.104 -1.704* 
Revenue 202.804 272.040 442.860 772.296 -0.623 
Leverage 0.219 0.174 0.225 0.144 -0.246 
Liquidity 0.681 0.822 0.339 0.364 1.304 
PPE 0.630 0.207 0.762 0.143 -2.140** 
Note: ROA= rate of return on assets; ROE = rate of return on common stock equity. 1st yr ROAc = first year 
ROA after an acquisition; 1st yr ROEd = first year ROE after an acquisition.  
* p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 
4.2 Testing Hypothesis 1  
In Table 4-4, the results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for postacquisition ROA 
and ROE changes up to 5 years are shown; there are significant negative effects. 
However, the negative effects are the strongest within a year after acquisition and 
decreased until 4 years compared with the previous year. After 4 years, the negative 
effects turn to positive compared to the previous year in ROA and ROE changes.  
Consequently, the results demonstrate that acquiring restaurant firms’ market 
performance is significantly negative on accounting performance. As a result, Hypothesis 
















Panel A: ROA Mean Z Mean Z Mean Z Z 
1st  yr post - base yr -0.022 -2.409** -0.060 -1.710* -0.009 -1.743* -0.788 
2nd yr post - base yr -0.023 -2.667*** -0.056 -1.363 -0.014 -2.218** -0.746 
3rd yr post - base yr -0.058 -3.961*** -0.066 -1.223 -0.056 -3.834*** 0.666 
4th yr post - base yr -0.083 -4.879*** -0.114 -2.824*** -0.074 -3.957*** -1.299 
5th yr post - base yr -0.063 -4.442*** -0.140 -2.756*** -0.038 -3.480*** -1.928* 
Panel B: ROE        
1st yr post - base yr 0.080 -2.468** 0.513 -1.086 -0.070 -2.185** -0.072 
2nd yr post - base yr -0.093 -2.799*** -0.312 -1.992** -0.030 -2.139** -0.858 
3rd yr post - base yr -0.218 -3.734*** -0.325 -1.223 -0.186 -3.600*** 0.390 
4th yr post - base yr 0.161 -4.106*** -0.488 -2.746*** 0.361 -3.098*** -1.921* 
5th yr post - base yr -0.171 -3.257*** -0.524 -2.490** -0.057 -2.214** -2.021** 
Note: ROA= rate of return on assets; ROE = rate of return on common stock equity. 
1st yr posta = first year ROA after an acquisition, base yrb = 1 year ROA before an acquisition; 1st yr postc = 
first year ROE after an acquisition, base yrd = 1 year ROE before an acquisition. 




4.3 Testing Hypothesis 2  
 Table 4-4 shows that the results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test. The results 
indicate that there is no significant difference in postacquiring firm performance between 
same-sector and different-sector acquisitions. 
 Tables 4-5 and 4-6 show the regression results for the firms’ accounting 
performances for acquisitions in different sectors and in the same sector. The results 
show that there is no significance between different-sector and same-sector acquisitions 
for all periods. However, the ROE of different-sector acquisitions is significantly positive 
in only the first year. In addition, leverage had a significant negative impact on the ROA 




no significance between different-sector and same-sector acquisitions. Thus, Hypothesis 




Table 4.5 Results for ROA Changes in Different-Sector and Same-Sector Acquisitions 
  1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 
  ∆ROA
a ∆ROA ∆ROA ∆ROA ∆ROA 
Different 
sectorb -0.157 -0.078 -0.102 -0.253 -0.324 
 (0.098) (0.095) (0.136) (0.151) (0.138) 
Same sectorc 0.028 0.017 -0.026 -0.028 0.038 
 (0.034) (0.031) (0.044) (0.049) (0.044) 
Revenue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.202** -0.236** -0.389** -0.120 -0.318* 
 (0.099) (0.102) (0.146) (0.175) (0.158) 
Liquidity 0.021 -0.016 -0.001 -0.027 0.058 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.053) (0.058) (0.050) 
PP&E 0.199* 0.124 0.175 0.281* 0.336** 
 (0.114) (0.104) (0.149) (0.157) (0.156) 
Adj. R2 0.081 0.104 0.120 0.134 0.245 
F value 2.050* 2.300* 2.500** 2.510** 3.790*** 
N 61 57 56 50 44 
Note: ROA= rate of return on assets. 1 𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟∆ROA= first year ROA after an acquisition – 1 year ROA 
before an acquisition. bDifferent sector stands for dummy =1 as different-sector acquisitions. cSame sector 
stands for dummy = 0 as same-sector acquisitions 




























Table 4.6 Results for ROE Changes in Different-Sector and Same-Sector Acquisitions 
  1st year 2nd year 3rd year 4th year 5th year 
  ∆ROE
a ∆ROE ∆ROE ∆ROE ∆ROE 
Different 
sectorb 2.220** -0.605 -0.574 -0.272 -1.825 
 (0.956) (0.457) (0.621) (3.677) (1.071) 
Same sectorc -0.365 0.165 -0.017 0.792 -0.118 
 (0.333) (0.146) (0.199) (1.184) (0.344) 
Revenue 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage 1.636* -1.464*** -2.186*** -0.429 -2.593** 
 (0.965) (0.488) (0.667) (4.258) (1.223) 
Liquidity -0.442 0.023 0.061 -0.492 0.389 
 (0.356) (0.179) (0.243) (1.413) (0.391) 
PP&E -2.813** 0.914* 1.007 0.422 2.526** 
 (1.103) (0.498) (0.676) (3.817) (1.213) 
Adj. R2 0.127 0.222 0.197 -0.082 0.170 
F value 2.750** 4.200*** 3.710*** 0.260 2.770** 
N 61 57 56 50 44 
Note: ROE= rate of return on common stock equity. 1 𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟∆ROE= first year ROE after an acquisition – 
1 year ROE before an acquisition. bDifferent sector stands for dummy =1 as different-sector acquisitions. 
cSame sector stands for dummy = 0 as same-sector acquisitions 





CHAPTER 5. CONCLUSION 
5.1 Key Findings 
In this study, the overall acquisition effects of restaurant firms were significantly 
negative on the firm’s ROA and ROE. The results of the Wilcoxon signed-rank test for 
postacquisition ROA and ROE changes up to 5 years showed significant negative effects. 
However, the negative effects were strongest within a year after the acquisition occurred 
and decreased until 4 years later compared with the previous year. After 4 years, the 
negative effects turned positive compared to the previous year in the ROA and ROE 
changes. These results indicate that acquiring firms cannot recover fully from the 
negative impacts after acquisition but the negative impacts become fainter as the years go 
by.  
The other findings are that even though there is no significant difference in 
postacquiring firm performance between same-sector and different-sector acquisitions, 
the overall z scores of different-sector acquisitions from the Wilcoxon rank tests show 
less negative postacquisition performance than same-sector acquisitions in ROA and 
ROE changes. The ROA changes in 2 and 3 years and the ROE changes in 1 and 3 years 
after acquisitions even appear nonsignificant only for the different-sector acquisitions. 




acquisitions. However, neither the results of the Wilcoxon rank tests nor regression 
analysis reveal significant differences in firm performance between the two types of 
acquisitions. Therefore, the effects of acquisition for different-sector and same-sector 
acquisitions are negative, and there is no significant difference between them. 
 
5.2 Theoretical Implications 
The findings of this study provide a perspective on the effect of acquisitions on 
firm performance. Most hospitality scholars have revealed that M&As are not beneficial 
for the acquiring firms’ performance or do not, at the minimum, last short-term. This 
study is in line with earlier studies that showed negative postacquisition operational 
performance but differs from the previous findings in terms of year effects since the 
negative effects are diminished after acquisition.  
 Additionally, in this study a resource-based view of restaurant segmentation was 
applied as a motivation for acquiring restaurants. This attempt is still meaningful because 
the relatedness of the business is a critical success factor (Canina et al., 2010) when 
restaurant managers consider acquiring other firms. Most previous studies investigated 
financial performance using combined restaurant firms’ data. The researchers did not 
classify sectors in the same industry or identify public and private firms. Thus, this study 
helps broaden understanding of restaurant firms’ postacquiring performance by 
differentiating full-service and limited-service restaurants in complicated acquiring 
procedures even though the results have not proposed sufficient theoretical support 





5.3 Managerial Implications 
From a practical viewpoint, the results suggest that acquiring other firms as a 
growth strategy is not appropriate for restaurant firms’ future profitability. In addition, 
since the negative acquisition effects last for more than 4 years, the restaurant firms 
should have enough financial capacity to overcome the deteriorated firm performance. 
Therefore, managers of the acquiring firm must consider their own market position, 
financial condition, human resources, and future economic environment with a long-term 
view when they plan to acquire other firms. 
 The results of this study cautiously suggest that different-sector acquisitions may 
be more beneficial than same-sector acquisition even though both types of transactions 
led to negative accounting performances for up to 5 years. Therefore, if restaurant firms 
need to grow faster for any strategic reason in spite of sacrificing their profit, they should 
acquire restaurants in different sectors. In addition, this study implies that due diligence 
procedures, deal types, and valuation of target firms are important; managers should 
deliberately include bargaining factors during the deal negotiation process. 
 
5.4 Research Limitations 
This study is not free from limitations. First, the sample size is small. The results 
may not be able to be generalized to other hospitality industries. Second, several 
important factors such as the type of payment, dividends, stock splits, and the degree of 
acquisition experience were not controlled in this study. Third, the debt situation when 
restaurants made acquisitions was not considered. Thus, the effects of the acquisitions 




 Future studies should consider these limitations to advance understanding of 
acquisitions by comparing various financing resources that may affect restaurant 
performance after acquisitions in each sector in the restaurant industry. Such an 
investigation would help restaurant executives find methods for positive abnormal returns 
and significant profitability as well, thus improving their performance in terms of ROA 
and ROE. Nevertheless, the results suggest that different types of acquisitions influence 
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